CVE-2026-45558

/// Technical description

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints (POST /api/service/haproxy/<server_id>/section/<section_type> and the PUT / global / defaults variants) accept a JSON option field that is not validated, not escaped, and is rendered verbatim into the generated HAProxy configuration via the section.j2, global.j2, and defaults.j2 Ansible templates. Because Roxy-WI then pushes the generated config to the load balancer and runs systemctl reload haproxy, an authenticated user with role ≤ 3 (user) can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives into the config that runs on every load balancer their group manages — including option external-check + external-check command /bin/bash -c '…', which gives remote code execution on the load balancer as the haproxy user on every health-check tick. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References