CVE-2026-46076

/// Technical description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isn't intercepted by L1

Explicitly synthesize a #UD for VMMCALL if L2 is active, L1 does NOT want

to intercept VMMCALL, nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() is true, and the

hypercall is something other than one of the supported Hyper-V hypercalls.

When all of the above conditions are met, KVM will intercept VMMCALL but

never forward it to L1, i.e. will let L2 make hypercalls as if it were L1.

The TLFS says a whole lot of nothing about this scenario, so go with the

architectural behavior, which says that VMMCALL #UDs if it's not

intercepted.

Opportunistically do a 2-for-1 stub trade by stub-ifying the new API

instead of the helpers it uses. The last remaining "single" stub will

soon be dropped as well.

[sean: rewrite changelog and comment, tag for stable, remove defunct stubs]

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References