CVE-2026-47065

/// Technical description

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy

Assessment: Fully addressed.

When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker

for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()

is

dispatched. JDK then calls the default

ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which

performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH

interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted

classes list .

ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in

readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes

Assessment: Fully addressed.

For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s

(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an

attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the

developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , att

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References