CVE-2026-52734

/// Technical description

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, an unauthenticated P2P peer can cause the mempool download pipeline to retain transactions after verification reaches the outer RATE_LIMIT_DELAY timeout. In zebrad/src/components/mempool/downloads.rs, Downloads::poll_next removed cancel_handles entries after success and ordinary verification errors, but tokio::time::error::Elapsed did not carry the UnminedTxId needed to remove the timed-out entry. Each retained cancel_handles entry could hold a full Gossip::Tx(UnminedTx), while normal mined-transaction cleanup could not match attacker transactions and no periodic garbage collection or count cap existed. Sustained traffic therefore caused monotonic memory growth until swap pressure degraded the node or the operating system terminated the zebrad process for exhausting memory. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References