CVE-2026-52737

/// Technical description

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious unauthenticated P2P peer can answer Zebra's outbound getblocks or FindBlocks request with a small two-hash inventory and then serve a syntactically valid block whose coinbase height is far above the local chain tip. In zebrad/src/components/sync/downloads.rs, BlockDownloadVerifyError::AboveLookaheadHeightLimit originally carried only the block height and hash, so handle_block_response could not attribute the failure to the advertising peer. The error then reached the restart-worthy default path in zebrad/src/components/sync.rs, cancelling all in-flight downloads from honest peers and imposing a 67-second sync restart delay on mainnet. Because the peer was neither scored nor disconnected, the peer could repeat the cycle indefinitely with minimal bandwidth and significantly degrade synchronization without corrupting state. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References