CVE-2026-64046

Technical Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG

Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current

code will create a chain link to content type right after

the wrap link:

This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly

to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator

does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links.

meaning this is illegal input to crypto.

The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after

the last one used so end = 0 means there's nothing pushed after

the wrap:

end start i

v v v

[ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap]

Skip the wrapping in this case.

TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it's chaining if end = 0.

This avoids the chain-after-chain.

Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content

type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but

Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

References