CVE-2026-82430

/// Technical description

Description

When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the

entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command

file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without

re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.

For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a

privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,

`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an

attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.

For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no

source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host p

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References