CVE-2026-90223

/// Technical description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and add length checks

nfc_llcp_recv_snl() walked the SNL TLV list using a u16 offset/length

pair derived from skb->len, without bounding reads to the actual skb

data. Three problems followed:

- For a short frame (skb->len < LLCP_HEADER_SIZE), tlv_len underflowed.

- The per-TLV header (type, length) was read without checking that two

bytes remained.

- A declared TLV length could run past the end of the buffer, and an

SDREQ with length == 0 made "service_name_len = length - 1" underflow

(size_t), driving an out-of-bounds read in the following strncmp() /

nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). The SDRES case likewise read tlv[2]/tlv[3]

without a length check.

A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link

activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.

Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer() over the

linear skb data, and

/// Remediation

Check the references section for vendor advisories, patches, and mitigation guidance. If immediate patching is not possible, review the CVSS vector to understand the attack surface and apply compensating controls such as network segmentation or access restrictions.

/// References